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Abstract    eCrime is now the typical volume property crime in the United Kingdom 
impacting more of the public than traditional acquisitive crimes such as burglary and car theft 
(Anderson et al, 2012). It has become increasingly central to the National Security Strategy of 
several countries; in the United Kingdom becoming a Tier One threat. While it is apparent to some 
governments that cybercrimes are now as much of a ‘problem’ as some forms of organised 
crime, little is known about the perceptions of the broad network of what we call public and 
private sector ‘eCrime controllers’ in the United Kingdom. A survey of 104 members of the UK 
Information Assurance community garnered data on the perceptions of the eCrime problem. 
The results showed an association of cooperation and consumption of data sources with 
perceptions. It is likely that perceptions within non-specialist corporate and public domains 
(non-IT and Finance) will begin to change as new cooperation arrangements are introduced as 
part of the UK Cyber Security Strategy. These findings call for a more in-depth qualitative 
understanding of the cooperation between eCrime controllers and their data consumption 
practices. Ascertaining what shapes this cooperation (and non-cooperation) and how 
perceptions compare with ‘actual’ threats and risks is necessary if we are to better understand 
the ‘social construction’ of the problem and subsequent policy and operational outcomes. 
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Introduction 
 
eCrime has become increasingly central to the National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom (HM Government, 2010, 2011) and of many other EU countries (for example, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands). Beyond the EU, it is high on the security agendas 
of other countries, including the United States, Australia, China, India and Russia (though 
some of their constructs of ‘security’ may involve breaching other countries’ corporate and 
governmental cyber defences). In the United Kingdom, eCrime has become a Tier One 
threat, above organised crime and fraud generally, although it is an extremely broad 
category 
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ranging from opportunist thefts (or, as we prefer to express them, ‘duplications’) of personal 
data to systematic mass attacks on banks, unauthorised obtaining of key corporate Intellectual 
Property (IP) and cyberwarfare, at the other extreme. Based on Crime Survey data from 
England, Wales and Scotland, and from Eurostat, eCrime is now the typical volume property 
crime in the United Kingdom, impacting more of the public than traditional acquisitive 
crimes such as burglary and car theft (Anderson et al, 2012). However, as with ‘organised 
crime’ and other national threats, substantial variations exist in the perceived prevalence of 
eCrime and its constituent components, and there is no simple translation of these strategic 
judgments into locally felt concerns. These present difficulties for public engagement in 
interventions, for public scepticisms may have to be overcome or lived with in the course of 
control strategies. Our study is the first to predict the perceptions of the eCrime controllers1 
within the UK Information Assurance (UKIA)2 community on the severity of the eCrime 
problem. Variation in opinions among these controllers, and influences upon them, are 
mapped via two regression models. The results indicate that perceptions of the eCrime prob- 
lem are correlated with levels of cooperation and consumption of certain data sources. 
Acknowledging these associations is important as it is likely that organisational perceptions 
(including public and private large and SMEs) will begin to change as new cooperation 
arrangements are introduced as part of the UK Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 
2011). The following sections provide the context to the article while also illustrating the 
complex nature of eCrimes information (in this instance definition and prevalence) which is 
commonly digested by the UKIA community. 
 
 
Context 
 
There is now a wealth of academic and consultancy research available to eCrime controllers 
on the rise of the cybercrime problem (see Williams, 2006; Yar, 2006; Wall, 2007; Garlik, 
2009; Jewkes and Yar, 2010; PwC, 2012; Symantec, 2012). Recently these sources evidence 
that the prevalence and severity of cybercrimes are increasing. Governments’ fears of nation- 
state-sponsored cyber attacks, which were often disregarded as scaremongering by sceptical 
academics, have been shown to contain at least some degree of reality, with the creation of 
complex malware for targeted attacks such as Stuxnet and most recently (as we write) Flame/ 
sKyWIper (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011; CrySyS Lab, 2012). Yet there remains ambiguity 
over the definitions and measurements of prevalence, impacts and costs of eCrime (Anderson 
et al, 2012; Levi and Williams, 2012). Part of the explanation of this lack of agreement rests 
with the foundation of eCrimes: technology. While conventional ‘terrestrial’ crimes are often 
rationalised and understood in terms of (a) being static in time, (b) being static in space, 
(c) being largely universally recognised as ‘criminal’ (politically, legally and publically), and 
(d) most frequently perpetrated by individuals from socio-economically marginalised back- 
grounds, the technology of the Internet disrupts all of these dimensions. As Giddens (1990) 
puts it, these new forms of networked technologies afford ‘distanciated’ interactions, meaning 
that an action in one spatial-temporal boundary may have an effect outside of that jurisdiction. 
Cyber criminals are able to attack their victims at-a-distance in compressed or expanded 
periods of time (Williams, 2010). There also remains confusion and misinformation regarding 
what cybercrimes are in the political, legal and public domains and even more uncertainty 
regarding the characteristics of the perpetrators of such acts. 
The United Nations highlighted the problem of definition in its Manual on the Prevention 
and Control of Computer-Related Crime (1995) stating that while there is consensus among 
experts, these definitions have been functional and hence too specific. The Council of 
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Europe took a similar view, and its Committee on Crime Problems decided to leave out any 
definition of cybercrime in its 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, allowing individual juri- 
sdictions to apply their own definitions based on their specific body of law, an approach that 
reflected a realistic judgment that preventative action should not await the unlikely event of 
global legal harmonisation. The EU did however provide a working definition for Europol’s 
initial mandate, though this definition only relates to attacks on automated data-processing 
systems (Council of the European Union, 2000). This related to Europol’s restricted mandate 
for certain crimes that can be committed over computer networks (drug and arms traffick- 
ing, counterfeiting, trafficking in human beings, child pornography, illegal immigration net- 
works, and so on), nullifying the necessity for a more comprehensive definition of eCrimes. 
The recent establishment of a European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol, however, will 
likely see renewed efforts at defining the problem, as well as intelligence sharing and stra- 
tegic interventions. Perhaps one of the more satisfying classificatory attempts is that of Wall 
(2007). He maps out cybercrimes in terms of whether the victim groups are individual users, 
corporate entities or nation states, their level of mediation by technology, and the type of 
offending behaviour. Wall goes on to specify (a) crimes against the machine (for example, 
hacking), (b) crimes using machines (for example, frauds) and (c) crimes in the machine 
(storing illegal materials). Finally, he distinguishes ordinary cybercrimes (those that assist 
terrestrial crimes), hybrid cybercrimes (global opportunities for ‘terrestrial’ crimes) and true 
cybercrimes (new opportunities for new types of crime such as Botnets). 
 
Data on eCrime 
 
A key problem to better understanding and controlling eCrimes is the lack of reliable data on 
their prevalence and impact on businesses, the national infrastructure and the general public. 
Several papers provide insightful reasons why existing data are flawed (see Casper, 2007; 
Anderson et al, 2008, 2012; and Sommer and Brown, 2011). The data issues identified include 
information asymmetries, the lack of data sharing protocols, confidentiality and anonymity of 
respondents, failure to adopt gold standard data collection practices, and knowledge and per- 
ception of victimisation. 
Anderson et al (2012) identified over one hundred different attempts to collect data on 
cybercrime to date. The sources most digested include reports of attack trends (for example, 
from Symantec and McAfee); security breach disclosure reports from the Information 
Commissioner’s Office; reports by trade bodies (for example, from the British Chambers of 
Commerce, the Federation of Small Businesses and banking trade associations) and surveys 
(for example, British Crime Survey, Offending Crime and Justice Survey, Commercial 
Victimisation Survey, Information Security Breaches Survey, Oxford Internet Survey and 
Eurostat). 
By far the most voluminous sources of data on eCrimes are vendor databases of malicious 
code  activity  (for  example,  Symantec’s  Threat  Assessment  Report).3   However,  these 
data understandably focus on breaches such as botnet activity and subsequent spam levels 
that are technologically measurable by vendor specific software, (that is, they bypass
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individuals’ awareness levels about breaches). This approach, while valuable in identifying 
overall trends, does not represent all the populations of interest (for example, public sector 
organisations, business community and domestic users) or perceptions of harm and insecu- 
rity. Essentially they cannot provide the detail required on prevalence of breaches within 
each sector or region (where the unit of analysis is an organisation or individual), the percei- 
ved or actual impact of breaches, and the reaction of business or individuals to attack. 
Numbers of attacks identified by anti-virus vendors may once have been meaningful, but the 
growth of server-side polymorphism4 has led to constant transformations which mean they 
are no longer a sensible count of malware. Furthermore, the origin of such statistics raises 
important questions of perceived impartiality. In terrestrial terms, such sources of data 
would be comparable with data produced by private security companies who provide 
services to local communities and businesses. Objectivity suffers in the face of economic 
drivers inherent in such enterprises. 
Police data on reported eCrimes is potentially the most impoverished source. An early 
review of police eCrime recording evidenced that the practices of individual police services 
varied enormously, with only a few including computer crime markers on crimes committed 
via computer networks (Hyde-Bales et al, 2004). More recent recording practices have been 
guided by the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) eCrime strategy (ACPO, 2009), 
which recommended that the National Fraud Reporting Centre (renamed Action Fraud) 
become the hub for all recorded eCrimes. While this has the benefit of harmonising recording 
practices across forces, the criminal justice system as a whole is restrained by the criminal 
law which is largely technology-neutral. We do not know whether breaches unrelated to 
fraud are thus reported, and businesses and individuals (and the police themselves) may not 
know who to turn to. The detail required by analysts (for example, the nature of an elec- 
tronic attack such as denial of service, distributed denial of service, insider unauthorised 
access, and so on), common to other eCrime sources, is often missing in police data. 
National surveys on eCrime identify the organisation or individual as the unit of analysis. 
That is to say an employee (usually the person with responsibility for IT security) is asked 
about security issues and attacks in relation to their organisation, or a member of the general 
population is asked similar questions in relation to the home. These surveys capture instances 
of ‘known’ victimisation where the respondent directly experiences an eCrime attack or 
has been made aware of the attack by software (for example, virus checker) or by another 
person (such as a payment card firm who telephones the victim about a transaction sus- 
pected by the firm). In contrast to vendor data, these surveys not only identify prevalence of 
‘known’ breaches, but also capture data on impact and response. Impact questions vary by 
survey, but often include length of system downtime, financial losses, potential reputational 
damage and anxiety in relation to possible future attack (in relation to surveys of the general 
public). Response questions include reporting and system upgrade behaviour, among other 
topics. 
The majority of the surveys on business eCrimes adopt non-random sampling. The result- 
ing data pool is biased towards knowledgeable victims from sectors where IT security is 
well embedded (that is, there is an IT security manager to answer the survey questions). 
Those respondents who are reluctant to respond, due to a lack of knowledge or interest 
or fear of reputational damage from notification of a breach, are absent from the data 
set, leaving a skewed picture of the eCrimes problem. Unlike in some American states, 
where Security Breach Notification is required by law, creating a near census of breaches
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(see Anderson et al, 2008), the UK picture from the perspective of surveys adopting 
non-random samples is partial and biased. 
While surveys that adopt random probability approaches to surveying eCrimes produce 
the most representative data, conceptual issues with question wording and with knowledge 
assumption can undermine the reliability and validity of data produced. Such problems led 
the European Commission i2010 High Level Group to conclude many of the questions in 
the Community Surveys on ICT Usage relating to business eCrimes attacks were unreliable. 
They also reported similar problems in relation to their domestic surveys (i2010 High Level 
Group, 2006). A European Commission sponsored review into eCrimes questions in the 
annual Information Society Surveys found questions relating to businesses were likely to be 
unreliable because: (i) SMEs lacked the expertise with technical terms; (ii) the outsourcing 
of security to specialists resulted in the lack of technical details; and (iii) the general reluc- 
tance of businesses to admit a problem in their own IT systems. In relation to domestic 
respondents the review concluded eCrimes questions were possibly unreliable due to: (i) a lack 
of expertise with the technical terms such as virus, firewall, and so on; (ii) the inability to 
trace back any incident to a certain cause (virus/adware/spyware/fraud); and (iii) the ambiguous 
or vague question wording (Empirica, 2007). 
Large-scale random probability national surveys, such as the Crime Survey for England 
and Wales (formerly the British Crime Survey), the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey: the 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey, and the Commercial Victimisation Survey, have some- 
times included questions on eCrimes victimisation and perpetration in their questionnaires. 
However, surprisingly few respondents reported eCrime experiences,5 and in the light of other 
data on anxiety about identity theft and the prevalence of security breaches, response validity 
is open to question. Furthermore, questions on e-victimisation are sparse, often only focusing 
on a very limited range of completed e-fraud.6 Given the problems outlined, it is apparent that 
the eCrimes data pool is currently unfulfilled, both in terms of quality and quantity, proving 
a confusing picture of the problem to eCrime controllers within the UKIA community. The 
largest databases produced by vendors are likely to be partial in their coverage and thus biased, 
while the best quality data from national surveys adopting random probability sampling techni- 
ques, suffer from poor conceptualisation and a paucity of detailed questions on the topic. 
 
 
The current picture of eCrime 
 
The ‘best’ data on business eCrime available in the United Kingdom before 20107 was the 
Information Security Breaches Survey (ISBS). The ISBS adopted probability sampling and 
adhered to standardised and well-conceptualised8  questions. In the domestic domain, the 
Oxford Internet Survey (OIS) represents the gold standard. The OIS adopts a random sam- 
pling technique and includes a good range of eCrimes questions that the general public 
understand. Figure 1 shows trends in business eCrimes over the last decade in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. What is clear in the United Kingdom is that the trend in 
eCrimes attacks has reversed from a general decline since 2004 to a sharp increase from 
2010. This is contrary to trends in the United States where a general decline in eCrimes 
breaches has been recorded since 2000 by the CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey.9 
Figure 2 shows ISBS recorded breaches over time disaggregated by eCrime type. Malware 
attacks show the most marked decrease in breaches between 2004 and 2008, followed by theft
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Figure 1:      Organisations reporting eCrimes breaches in the United Kingdom and United States (1998–2010). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:      UK organisations reporting breaches by eCrime type (2000–2010). 
Source: PwC ISBS. 
 
and fraud and insider misuse. The reported prevalence of unauthorised access (including hack- 
ing) remained relatively stable in the same period. Reports in 2010 indicate a sharp increase in 
prevalence for malware infection, insider misuse and unauthorised access, and a slightly mod- 
est increase in reports of theft and fraud. Reports of insider misuse and unauthorised access 
peak at new all-time highs (42 and 49 per cent, respectively), while malware attacks return to 
near their peak prevalence in 2004. 
Figure 3 details trends over time in domestic eCrimes breaches collected by the Oxford 
Internet Survey. Given the public’s limited understanding of many eCrime types, this survey 
adopts more colloquial terms to ensure robust data collection. Unfortunately this precludes 
a forensic comparison with business eCrimes trends. However, the pattern of those members 
of the public experiencing virus attacks is similar to the patterns of business malware attacks. 
A decline is evident from 2005 to 2009, with a definite upward trend in 2011 (an increase of 7 
per cent compared with 2009). Similarly, there is an upward trend in recorded domestic phish- 
ing attempts, indicating, as with business-recorded eCrimes, that eFraud is on the increase. 
The British Crime Survey only routinely includes eCrime questions relating to fraud. 
The last tranche showed 4 per cent had suffered from this type of victimisation, twice the
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Figure 3:      Domestic breaches by eCrimes type (2003–2011). 
Source: Oxford Internet Institute Internal Survey. 
 
 
proportion who experienced burglary or car theft.10 The 2010 Eurostat ICT survey shows 
the 5 per cent of respondents from the United Kingdom suffered payment card fraud, placing 
it first in rank compared with all other European countries in the survey. The United 
Kingdom placed second for financial losses caused by phishing and pharming attacks 
(Anderson et al, 2012). These domestic eCrimes data add weight to the position that 
in general eCrime trends are on the rise in the United Kingdom and that online property 
victimisation is now overtaking its terrestrial counterparts. 
 
 
The UKIA community 
 
The control of eCrime is a networked activity, involving multiple actors from across indus- 
try sectors and public departments both nationally and internationally. It is the prime candi- 
date for networked and nodal regulation (Johnston and Shearing, 2003), given the 
transformative nature of the Internet and its global reach. While the police are a significant 
actor within this network, their traditional local dominance over the security domain is 
diluted by the expertise brought by the private sector, especially finance and IT (Wall and 
Williams, 2007). As Grabosky and Smith (2001, p. 8) note, ‘much computer-related illegality 
lies beyond the capacity of contemporary law enforcement … security in cyberspace will 
depend on the efforts of a wide range of institutions’. Furthermore, the resource constrains 
upon governments have forced them to enlist the assistance of the private sector and wider 
civil society in what is possibly the most significant policing challenge in modern times 
(Williams, 2006). 
Early attempts to delineate the network of eCrime controllers were limited by the primi- 
tive development of the governmental architectures of the time (see Walker and Akdeniz, 
1998). Since the introduction of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 
this architecture has matured, allowing more recent attempts at mapping this structure to
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be more forensic. The Information Assurance Collaboration Group’s (IACG)11 UKIA map 
2011 (issue 3.1) delineates the community into seven groupings: Regulatory Bodies 
(OFCOM, ICO, and so on); International Forums (ENISA,12 ISSF,13 and so on); Government/ 
Industry Groups (EURIM,14 Get Safe Online, and so on), Professional Bodies (The Law 
Society,  BCS,15   and  so  on);  Government  (Home  Office, GCHQ,  and  so  on);  Trade 
Associations & Industry Groups (IT Security Forum, Nominet, and so on); and Academic 
and Research Bodies. Outside of these groupings exist the private actors, such as the finance 
and IT sectors, who also play a role in providing advice and data on eCrimes to the police, 
government and public. 
The recent UK Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011) calls for more partner- 
ship working and information sharing among this diverse group of controllers in an attempt 
to foster a more intelligence-driven strategic fight against the eCrime problem. Partnership 
‘hubs’ were piloted in 2011 in defence, finance, telecommunications, pharmaceutical 
and energy sectors with an expected national rollout in late 2012. Existing informal part- 
nership working has been scoped in the Nominet eCrime Reduction Partnership Mapping 
Study (Levi and Williams, 2012), which evidences strengths and gaps in collaboration. 
The study also showed that the UKIA community perceptions of the eCrime problem were 
largely symmetrical with the eCrime data outlined in the previous section. However, they 
were only able to examine ordinal symmetry (the ordering of most to least problematic 
eCrimes) and were not able to conclude the degree of cardinal symmetry (rises and falls 
in both perceptions and the amounts of recorded eCrimes). Currently, little is known 
about how these various controllers digest the eCrime information outlined previously, 
and what influence this and forms of existing cooperation have on perceptions of the 
problem. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1:    Levels of cooperation with domain specialist groups (finance and IT 
organisations) will impact positively upon the perceptions of the eCrime 
problem. 
 
This assumption is based on three premises: (a) criminological research that identifies 
previous victimisation as a strong predictor of perceptions of national and local crime 
trends (Mohan et al, 2011), (b) research that shows organisations with more expertise 
and resources to detect crime will identify more breaches (Carr-Hill and Stern, 1979), and 
(c) research that shows that ‘controllers’ are more likely to perceive that there is a crime 
problem in their jurisdiction (Blom-Cooper and Drabble, 1982). In reference to (a) we 
argue that both finance and IT UKIA organisations are more likely to have been subject 
to more eCrimes (that were detected) than other organisations, given their desirability 
as targets. In relation to (b) as a result of their desirability as targets, both types of organi- 
sation are more likely to have increased levels of security to identify breaches. In relation 
to (c) we assume those who cooperate with finance organisations will perceive higher 
levels of eFrauds and those who cooperate with IT organisations will perceive higher 
levels of Security Breaches. This is likely not only due to the cumulative effect of (a) and 
(b) but also that these organisations potentially have a vested interest in communicating
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their plight in relation to their respective eCrime problems, possibly to vie for more 
resources. 
 
Hypothesis 2:    Consumption of eCrime data sources will impact upon the perceptions of 
the eCrime problem. 
 
The impact of secondary information sources, such as the media, on shaping perceptions 
of crime among the general public is well established (Greer and Reiner, 2012). Based on 
this premise we surmise that secondary eCrime data sources, such as surveys and police- 
recorded crime statistics, will impact upon perceptions of eCrime among controllers. Given 
the lack of evidence on the impact of eCrime data on perceptions, we make no assumption 
on the effect of particular types of sources. 
As per conventional scientific methodology null hypotheses (H0) were generated from 
the two alternative hypotheses above indicating the absence of an effect in each case. The 
models reported later provide evidence to reject the null hypotheses, lending support for our 
alternative hypotheses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
 
 
Methods and Research Design 
 
Data generation 
 
While data exist on eCrime patterns (via law enforcement and private channels) there are 
currently no publicly available data on the perceptions of eCrime controllers. The Information 
Security Breaches Survey generates the most robust data set on the experiences of eCrime 
and security, but it does not ask specific questions regarding perceptions of eCrime from 
the organisations it surveys. Furthermore, the sampling frame includes all organisations 
(public and private) in the United Kingdom and the results do not disaggregate the UKIA 
community from the overall sample. The primary data used in this analysis were derived 
from a cross-sectional study of UKIA community perceptions of the eCrime problem. 
Cross-sectional designs allow for researchers to observe a subset of a population providing 
a ‘snap-shot’ of activity or perception in a specific timeframe. We used an online survey as 
our research instrument to collect quantitative data on demographic, activity and perception- 
based characteristics on 104 Information Assurance organisations in the United Kingdom in 
2011. The IACG UKIA map 2011 (issue 3.1) was used to draw a sample.16  The Bristol 
Online Survey tool17 was used to design and distribute the survey via email to CEOs and 
senior security managers. All listed organisations in the UKIA map were contacted where 
possible, amounting to a target population of 200 organisations. Nonprobability sampling 
was employed to derive the sample of organisations. While sample bias is a fundamental 
shortcoming of nonprobability sampling, Dorofeev and Grant (2006) note that this is often 
the only option available to researchers embarking on exploratory research. Furthermore, as 
the hypotheses tested in this analysis are concerned more with the existence of inter-variable 
relations and strengths of association than estimating population prevalence,18 the use of 
nonprobability sampling does not fundamentally weaken the design of the study (Dorofeev 
and Grant, 2006). Moreover, our study is principally concerned with ‘soft’ measures (per- 
ceptions), which have no absolute validity (they cannot be compared with any authoritative
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external measure). However, Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) caution that sampling bias 
can still affect hypothesis testing if a sample is significantly uncharacteristic of the target 
population. Selective targeting was employed during survey recruitment to mitigate this 
potential problem. We achieved a 52 per cent response rate with good coverage within all 
sectors (public, private, criminal justice, voluntary, regulatory bodies and groups). 
The research was conducted in line with the ethical guidance established by the 
Association of Internet Researchers19  and the British Society of Criminology. Given 
the nature of the research topic the authors made efforts to establish informed consent via 
the introduction page to the online survey. The research aims and objectives were clearly 
expressed and all respondents were informed that the data produced would be anonymised 
and would remain confidential. 
 
 
Methods and Measures 
 
Dependent variables 
 
The survey included five items that measured UKIA organisational perceptions of the 
eCrime problem in the United Kingdom on a four-point ordinal scale (‘not a problem’ 
through to ‘a very serious problem’). Factor Analysis was used as a data reduction method 
to identify the underlying components of the five items (inter-correlations of a set of varia- 
bles). Principal components factor analysis, where each variable is standardised to have a 
mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0, was used with orthogonal rotation (varimax). 
Two components (Security Breaches and eFrauds) were extracted based on an inspection of 
the scree plot and rotated factor loadings (see results). 
Both components were included in separate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
models as dependent variables. The results from correlational analyses (not shown), and 
tolerance statistics and variance inflation factors showed there were no problems with 
multicollinearity among the predictor variables. Diagnostics indicated a robust fit to the data 
in both models with both R2 statistics exceeding the social science benchmark of a ‘good’ 
fit: 0.30 (Cohen, 1988).20 
 
 
Predictor variables 
 
Organisation type 
UKIA community respondents were asked to identify their organisation from a list of types. 
These types were then recoded into eight categories reflecting the diverse nature of the 
UKIA community. These variables were entered as into the regression models to control for 
organisational influences over the dependent measures. 
 
Cooperation 
Respondents were asked to indicate their frequency of cooperation with other eCrime 
controllers in their network on a four-point ordinal scale (ranging from ‘no cooperation’ 
to ‘a lot of cooperation’). These variables were entered as predictors in the regression 
models.
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eCrime data sources 
Six eCrimes data sources were identified, ranging from national Government surveys to 
bespoke financial data sets on security breach detection. Respondents were asked which, if 
any, they consulted as an organisation. Responses were included as binary variables in the 
regression models. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
All responding organisations that took part in the study belonged to the UKIA community. 
Table 1 provides details of the organisations who responded to the online survey. The larg- 
est group of responding organisations were the private sector (37.6 percent), with IT secu- 
rity suppliers making up the majority, followed by ‘other’ private organisations and financial 
services. Just under one-fifth of respondents (18.3 percent) originated from government and 
public sector organisations and just over 13 per cent came from groups and regulatory bodies. 
Just over 10 per cent of respondents originated from the police and 12.5 per cent from 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of UKIA organisations N=104 
 
Independent variables Coding  Sample  
  M  SD 
Organisation type Gov. CJ 0.06  0.23 
 Gov. non-CJ 0.13  0.33 
 Private – Finance 0.09  0.28 
 Private – IT 0.15  0.36 
 Private – Other 0.14  0.34 
 Group/Reg. body 0.14  0.34 
 Charity/NfP 0.13  0.33 
 Academic/Research 0.08  0.27 
 Police 0.11  0.30 
Cooperation with Gov. CJ (0–3) 1.87  1.24 
 with Gov. non-CJ (0–6) 2.77  2.09 
 with Private – Finance (0–3) 1.58  1.21 
 with Private – IT (0–3) 1.67  1.23 
 with Private – Other (0–3) 1.16  1.08 
 with Group/Reg. bodies (0–15) 7.52  5.09 
 with Charity/NfPs (0–3) 0.90  1.07 
 with Academia (0–3) 1.44  1.13 
 with Police (0–3) 1.85  1.24 
Data sources consulted Gov. surveys 0.54  0.50 
 Recorded (non-police) 0.65  0.48 
 Recorded (police) 0.52  0.50 
 Private security surveys 0.67  0.47 
 Vertical market sources 0.39  0.49 
 Academic research 0.71  0.46 
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charities/non-profit organisations. Half of responding organisations had 250 employees or 
more (48.1 per cent) and had been in operation for over 20 years (52.9 per cent). Small 
(between 1 and 9 employees) and young (5 years or less) organisations represented just over 
one-fifth of the sample (20.2 and 19.2 per cent, respectively). 
 
Factor Analysis 
 
The five eCrime items that measured organisational perceptions of the eCrime problem 
were subjected to principal components analysis. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of 
the items revealing the presence of multiple coefficients at 0.3 and above. Factor analysis 
would not reduce variables to underlying components if perceptions of all five eCrimes 
were very highly correlated (r => 0.9). Equally, if no strong correlations were present, 
all eCrime items would reduce to five underlying factors, mitigating the need for reduction. 
In our factor analysis, organisational perceptions of the seriousness of the malware 
problem strongly correlated with perceptions of the seriousness of the Denial of Service 
problem (r = 0.56) and Hacking problem (r = 0.66); and organisational perceptions of the 
seriousness of the Customer ID theft problem strongly correlated with perceptions of the 
Corporate ID theft problem (r = 0.67). This matrix therefore provides evidence that the 
eCrime items reduce to two or more components. Furthermore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin 
value was 0.787, exceeding the recommended value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1974), and Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the 
correlation matrix. Both associations between sets of variables and Cronbach’s α (0.870) 
indicated that reduction to underlying factors was possible. 
Table 3 presents the factor loadings for responses (major loadings for each item in bold). 
The two component solutions explained 79 per cent of the variance, with component one 
contributing 65.19 per cent and component two contributing 13.81 per cent. To aid interpre- 
tation, orthogonal (varimax) rotation was performed. The rotated solution revealed the pres- 
ence of a relatively simple structure, with both components showing a number of strong 
loadings, and the majority of variables loading substantially on only one component. 
Responses that are loaded heavily on component one are specific to Security Breaches (for 
example, Malware, Denial of Service and Hacking) but not eFrauds; responses that are 
loaded heavily on component two are specific to eFrauds (Personal and Corporate Identity 
Theft) but not Security Breaches. Therefore, component one was designated Security Breaches 
and component two was designated eFrauds. These components represent measures of the 
 
 
Table 2:  Spearman correlation coefficients among the perceptions of the five eCrime types 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1  Malware 1.00 — — — — 
2  Denial of service 0.560 1.00 — — — 
3  Hacking 0.658 0.677 1.00 — — 
4  Customer ID theft 0.491 0.537 0.546 1.00 — 
5  Corporate ID theft 0.548 0.387 0.569 0.677 1.00 
All correlations significant at p < 0.01.
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Table 3:  Factor loadings with Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy 
 
Item                                                                                                            Rotated factor loadings 
 
To what extent does your organisation perceive the 
following as a problem within the United Kingdom 
today? 
Component 1 Component 2 
Malware 0.887 0.177 
Denial of service 0.801 0.392 
Hacking 0.721 0.404 
Customer ID theft 0.248 0.904 
Corporate ID theft 0.358 0.805 
   χ2(10)=206.32, p < 0.00; Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (overall)=0.787. 
 
 
perceived seriousness of the two reduced eCrime types by the respondents in the UKIA 
community sample. 
 
 
Regression Models 
 
The predictor variables were regressed onto the outcome variables, perceptions of the problem 
of Security Breaches and eFrauds, using two OLS regression models (Table 4). Three sub- 
models containing only the predictor variables for (i) Organisational Type, (ii) Cooperation 
and (iii) eCrime Data Source were also run separately to identify the total variance explained 
in the dependent measures by each set of predictor variables.21 
 
 
Cooperation 
 
Several significant associations emerged between the cooperation predictors and the outcome 
measures. Holding all other factors constant, cooperating with private IT organisations signi- 
ficantly predicted perceptions that Security Breaches were a serious problem, as did coop- 
eration with Government non-Criminal Justice Departments and Charities/Not-for-Profit 
organisations. Conversely cooperating with Groups/Regulatory Bodies and Government 
Criminal Justice related departments significantly predicted the perception that security 
beaches were not so much of a serious problem. Only one cooperation type emerged as a 
significant predictor in relation to eFrauds. Cooperating with finance organisations signifi- 
cantly predicted perceptions that eFrauds are a serious problem, while a slight negative 
association (only approaching significance) emerged between cooperating with IT organisa- 
tions and perceptions that eFrauds are a serious problem.22 
 
 
eCrime data sources 
 
Significant associations emerged between the eCrime data sources predictor and both out- 
come measures. Holding all other factors constant, organisations that consulted non-police 
recorded data (from UKPA, CIFAS, NFA) were significantly more likely to perceive both
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Table 4:  Ordinary least squares regression models for perceptions of Security Breaches and eFrauds 
 
Model 1: Security Breaches                               Model 2: eFrauds 
 
 B  SE β B  SE β 
Organisation type         
Gov. non-CJ − 0.34  0.60 − 0.09 − 0.02  0.53 − 0.01 
Private – Finance − 0.84  0.62 − 0.26* 0.57  0.55 0.19 
Private – IT − 0.20  0.61 − 0.07 0.12  0.54 0.05 
Private – Other 0.38  0.60 0.13 − 0.67  0.53 − 0.26 
Group/Reg. body − 0.17  0.65 − 0.05 − 0.91  0.58 − 0.27* 
Charity/NfP − 0.97  0.60 − 0.31* − 0.68  0.53 − 0.24 
Academic/Research 0.50  0.64 0.13 0.07  0.56 0.02 
Police 0.34  0.57 0.11 − 0.82  0.50 − 0.30* 
(Ref: Gov. CJ) —  — — —  — — 
Cooperation         
with Gov. CJ − 0.40  0.20 − 0.50** 0.15  0.18 0.21 
with Gov. non-CJ 0.28  0.13 0.57** − 0.05  0.11 − 0.11 
with Private – Finance − 0.07  0.26 − 0.09 0.41  0.23 0.54** 
with Private – IT 0.62  0.20 0.73*** − 0.27  0.18 − 0.35* 
with Private – Other 0.38  0.26 0.39* − 0.17  0.23 − 0.20 
with Group/Reg. bodies − 0.13  0.07 − 0.67** − 0.06  0.06 − 0.35 
with Charity/NfPs 0.38  0.17 0.39** − 0.06  0.15 − 0.07 
with Academia − 0.40  0.25 − 0.43* 0.25  0.22 0.30 
with Police − 0.09  0.18 − 0.12 − 0.14  0.16 − 0.19 
Data sources consulted         
Gov. surveys 0.20  0.29 0.09 − 0.04  0.26 − 0.02 
Recorded (non-police) 1.01  0.39 0.44*** 1.02  0.35 0.49*** 
Recorded (police) − 0.81  0.34 − 0.38** − 0.29  0.31 − 0.15 
Private security surveys − 0.30  0.37 − 0.12 − 0.37  0.33 − 0.17 
Vertical market sources 0.09  0.36 0.04 − 0.53  0.32 − 0.28* 
Academic research 0.36  0.45 0.13 0.63  0.40 0.26* 
Constant − 0.35  0.64 — 0.20  0.57 — 
Model fit         
sig.  0.017  —  0.010  — 
R2  0.45  —  0.48  — 
N a=  80  —  80  — 
*p< 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01. 
aReduction in sample size due to listwise deletion of cases necessary for regression requirements. 
 
 
Security Breaches and eFrauds as serious problems, compared with organisations that con- 
sulted other sources. As both models controlled for organisation type, this association is not 
explained by the assumption that financial organisations are more likely to consult these 
data sources, who are themselves more likely to perceive these eCrimes as more of a serious 
problem. To the contrary, the organisation type predictor shows that finance organisations 
were less likely23 to think security breaches were a problem (compared with the reference 
category Government Criminal Justice Related); and there was no significant association
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with perceptions of the eFrauds problem. The first model also showed that organisations 
that consulted police eCrimes data were less likely to think there was a problem with secu- 
rity breaches compared with organisations that consulted other types of data. In the second 
model, a negative association between consulting vertical market sources and perceptions 
the eFrauds problem was present, while consulting academic sources increased the likeli- 
hood of perceiving a problem with eFrauds. However, both associations only approached 
conventional levels of significance. 
 
 
Sub-model analysis 
 
In order to ascertain which sets of variables (cooperation or sources) were most influential 
in forming the perceptions of UKIA organisations in regard to the eCrime problem, we 
conducted sub-model analyses. By isolating cooperation and sources variables in separate 
regression models we were able to determine how much variance these explained in the 
dependent measures independently. We examined the R2 statistic which is the coefficient of 
determination in the models that indicates how well the model predicts the observed data 
(model fit). An R2 of 1 indicates a perfect fit to the data, meaning the independent variables 
in the model explain 100 per cent of the variance in the dependent. The most widely applied 
guidelines are those developed by Cohen (1988). These criteria specify  that r = 0.10 is 
‘small’, r = 0.30 is ‘medium’ and r = 0.50 is ‘large’. As stated earlier in the article, the social 
science standard for a ‘good’ fit is R2: 0.30. With all predictor variables included (coopera- 
tion, sources and controls) the Security Breaches model fit was R2: 0.45, while the model fit 
for eFrauds was R2: 0.48 (both far in excess of the social science standard for a ‘good’ fit). 
Sub-model analysis revealed that independently the set of cooperation predictors accounted 
for 24 per cent (R2: 0.24) and 20 per cent (R2: 0.20) of the variance for perceptions 
that Security Breaches and eFrauds were a serious problem, respectively. Independently the 
set of eCrime data sources predictors accounted for 10 per cent (R2: 0.10) and 20 per cent 
(R2: 0.20) of the variance for perceptions of Security Breaches and eFrauds, respectively. 
In summary, cooperation with organisations was most predictive of perceptions of Security 
Breaches, whereas data sources consulted and cooperation were equally predictive of 
perceptions of eFrauds. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Both cooperation and consumption of eCrime data sources had significant influences on the 
formation of eCrimes perceptions among controllers within the UKIA community. Both 
models provide evidence in support of the first hypothesis, that cooperation with domain 
specialists (finance and IT organisations) will positively predict perceptions that eCrimes 
pose a serious problem. However, these influences were not symmetrical. Organisations that 
had higher levels of cooperation with private IT companies, non-criminal justice government 
departments and charities were significantly more likely to perceive Security Breaches 
as a serious problem. These patterns were not mirrored in relation to perceptions of 
eFrauds, where only cooperation with the finance sector was greatly predictive. Curiously 
cooperation with groups and regulatory bodies, and criminal justice-related government
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departments was negatively associated with perceptions that Security Breaches constituted 
a serious problem. 
A possible explanation for these patterns is the higher victimisation and detection levels 
in the domain-specific organisations, which are subsequently communicated to partners 
(cooperation with IT organisations was the greatest predictor, 0.73 in relation to Security 
Breaches, as was cooperation with finance in relation to eFrauds, 0.54). The cumulative 
knock-on effects of high victimisation, including increased investment in detection and 
demand for resources furthers the zeal with which these organisations communicate their 
domain-specific problem, causing a ripple effect throughout the wider UKIA community.24 
This is further supported by the sub-model analysis which revealed cooperation was most 
predictive, compared with eCrime data sources, of perceptions that Security Breaches are a 
serious problem. However, this did not stand for perceptions of the eFrauds problem, where 
eCrime data sources consulted shaped perception just as much. The negative associations 
between cooperation and perceptions of the Security Breach problem are more difficult to 
explain. Further qualitative work into the nature of the cooperation of criminal justice- 
related government departments and groups and regulatory bodies is necessary to under- 
stand why it is associated with the perception that Security Breaches are less of a problem. 
Evidence in the models that showed consumption of non-police eCrimes data was greatly 
predictive of perceptions that both Security Breaches and eFrauds were more of a problem 
supports the second hypothesis. Why domain specialist data on breaches and frauds (CIFAS, 
UKPA, NFA) increases perceptions that these eCrimes are serious problems is unclear, 
especially when it is the only positive predictive source of information. Research by Levi 
and Williams (2012) shows that this type of source is most highly regarded in terms of quality 
by UKIA community members, but why consultation with it results in the perception that 
both types of eCrime are more of a problem is unclear. Of course, the direction of causality 
may reverse – those who think that these eCrimes problems are serious use data that are 
‘good’ and ‘useful’ in helping address the problems. Further qualitative research is required 
to investigate this association. 
Consulting police eCrimes data was negatively associated with the perception that 
Security Breaches (but not eFrauds) are a serious problem. This source of eCrime data may 
suffer from the lack of granularity in existing crime codes for these types of offences. 
Historically, reports of eCrime to the police have been faced with inconsistent record 
keeping and recording practices, which often precluded the identification of an electronic 
element in the modus operandi (Hyde-Bales et al, 2004). Thus it becomes impossible even 
to conduct any detailed analysis of official sources on the prevalence of eCrime in England 
and Wales. The law generally takes a technology neutral stance to offences (for example, 
fraud is fraud whatever the modus operandi). This flexible approach ensures the law does 
not fall behind the rapidly changing technological landscape, but it means that we cannot 
track the techniques of crime. In an attempt to combat this shortfall, some local forces attach 
a computer crime marker to command and control incident records, crime desk records and 
crime-related intelligence logs. These practices however are far from systematic, and signi- 
ficant gaps still remain in the recording process. Therefore, denial of service attacks, hack- 
ing, malware infection and the like are unlikely to be easily identifiable from police 
crime digests, potentially resulting in the perception that they are less of a problem. Over 
time however, the police eCrime data pool may become fuller and more forensic given 
existing cyber priorities. The ACPO (2009) Strategy is under review and is likely to change
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in light of the establishment of the National Crime Agency (late 2013) which will take 
a strategic lead on eCrime. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The models presented in this article provide the first quantitative evidence on which factors 
best and least predict controllers’ perceptions of the eCrime problem. While the UKIA 
community perceptions of the eCrime problem are largely symmetrical with the best eCrime 
data available (Levi and Williams, 2012), until now there have been no data to suggest what 
influences these perceptions. The predictive power of cooperation with other organisations 
is not counter-intuitive. Partnership working, whether formal or informal, will always influ- 
ence the perceptions of actors in a network. This study has shown that cooperation with IT 
and finance organisations is associated with perceptions that both Security Breaches and 
eFrauds are more of a problem. The question remains whether partnership working with 
these organisations increased the perception of severity of both eCrimes within the UKIA 
community, or whether members of the community were attracted to cooperating with these 
organisations due to their pre-existing perception that these eCrimes were a problem, in 
order to help mitigate them. In either case, the partnership drive pushed forward by the 
UK Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011) will forge more formal links between 
UKIA community members, potentially widening the net to traditionally less cooperative 
organisations (such as local government, see Levi and Williams, 2012). Who they cooperate 
with may alter their existing perceptions of the eCrime problem, potentially heightening 
awareness and enhancing risk perception.25 
The influence on perceptions of prevalence and seriousness of crime representations, be 
they from the media or primary data sources, is well documented. This study shows that 
certain eCrimes primary data sources, chiefly non-police domain-specific sources, are posi- 
tively associated with perceptions of the problem of both eCrime types examined. Conversely, 
those who use police data are less likely to think that eCrimes are a serious problem. These 
patterns may have something to do with the ‘fidelity’ of the data recorded as mentioned 
previously. Further qualitative work is needed to understand the nuances of these influences, 
for example, are perceptions brought into line with the current level of risk or reduced/ 
raised, especially if the network of eCrime controllers is to expand to include non-specialists 
(that is, non-finance and IT). Or might it be the case, as we suspect, that pre-existing percep- 
tions that these eCrimes are a serious problem motivate consultation with specific sources, 
that is, those who are worried want to find out more. 
The National Statistician (National Statistician, 2011) was critical of the Home Office 
for its failure to address statistics on fraud in general and eCrimes in particular. In our view, 
attempts to measure all cybercrimes and their direct and indirect costs precisely are doomed 
to failure. However, better statistics than we have at present on their costs to and impact on 
individuals, businesses of different types, and government are important and are possible. 
In addition to their inherent value in helping us understand the risks that we face, these 
data would help the UKIA community to more rationally direct prevention efforts and assess 
their impact. This assessment is much more difficult where estimates are speculative, 
because if the estimates fall or rise, we seldom know whether this is due to measurement error 
or to real changes in the phenomenon. However for some components that are inherently
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difficult to define and identify as eCrime, and/or where the survey instruments do not exist 
or are distrusted, there will always be an element of uncertainty. Besides, some organisations 
will always want more real-time ‘close to market’ data to address rapidly changing or 
unchanging threats. 
This article has shown the association of cooperation and consumption of data sources 
with perceptions of the eCrime problem. Knowing these associations exist is important 
given that the recent UK Cyber Security Strategy has called for more cooperation and more 
robust sources of evidence. It is likely that perceptions within non-specialist corporate and 
public domains (non-IT and Finance) will begin to change as new cooperation arrangements 
are introduced. These quantitative findings call for a more in-depth qualitative understand- 
ing of the cooperation between eCrime controllers and their data consumption practices. 
Ascertaining why these factors have an influence and how perceptions compare with ‘actual’ 
threats and risks is necessary if we are to better understand the ‘social construction’ of the 
problem and subsequent policy and operational outcomes. 
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Notes 
 
1  The term eCrime Controllers is preferred to other terms, such as eCrime Policing or eCrime Regulators: it 
indicates that a broader range of relevant parties are involved in controlling eCrime, beyond just law enforce- 
ment and government regulators. 
2  In this article we define the UKIA community in the broadest sense, including criminal justice agencies, private 
sector (IT, Finance and SMEs), public sector (criminal justice and non-criminal justice departments), academia, 
voluntary sector and industry groups and forums. A fuller description is provided in the methods section of the 
article. 
3  Symantec gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 133 million client, server and gateway sys- 
tems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network collects 
data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks that provide valuable insight into 
attacker methods. 
4  A process where the engine responsible to altering the behaviour of malware resides outside of the malware 
itself, usually on a website. By extracting this function from within malware, analysts find it more difficult to 
identify and eradicate infection. 
5  The Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 2010/11 estimated that 4.5 per cent of adults had experienced card fraud 
in the 12 months before interview and 0.5 per cent of adults had been a victim of identity theft, where someone 
had pretended to be them or used their personal details fraudulently. For card fraud, there were roughly the 
same instances of cards themselves being used without permission (2.4 per cent) and just the card details being 
used (2.2 per cent). 
6  The BCS included a technology crimes module in 03/04 but it has not since been repeated. The only consistent 
question in this survey on eCrime relates to identity fraud (since 05/06). 
7  The 2010 ISBS adopted a self-selecting sample framework that reduced the representativeness of the findings 
and therefore precluded a robust basis for comparison with previous ISBS surveys. 
8  PricewaterhouseCoopers’ research team ensured that questions asked in the first survey (1998) became stand- 
ard for all subsequent surveys. This ensured that (to the extent that they were the same individuals) respondents 
became familiar with the terms expressed, resulting in plausibly sounder answers over time.
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9  The data for the ISBS 2010 presented in Graph 1 are derived from the responses from small- to medium-sized 
firms as they represented the largest group of respondents. It is important to note reports of eCrimes breaches 
from large firms were far in excess of those reported by SMEs, making the sharp increase in eCrimes attacks in 
Graph 1 a conservative estimate. 
10  The BCS does not distinguish online from offline frauds, but the former is likely to have accounted for the 
majority of fraud. 
11  IACG is an initiative within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Communications– 
Electronics Security Group (CESG). 
12  European Network & Information Security Agency 
13  Information Security Forum. 
14  The Information Security Alliance. 
15  The Chartered Institute for IT. 
16  IACG is an initiative within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Communications– 
Electronics Security Group (CESG). See http://www.cesg.gov.uk/Publications/Documents/uk_ia_community 
.pdf. 
17  See http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/. 
18  Where population estimates are provided they should be interpreted with a degree of caution. 
19  See: https://aoir.org/documents/ethics-guide/. 
20  Model fit statistics are presented in Table 4. 
21  The results of sub-models not presented here, aside from the R2 statistic. More detailed results available upon 
request. 
22  Ascertaining ‘causality’ or direction of association is problematic in cross-sectional designs. We address this 
problem in relation to our data in the discussion section. 
23  This association only approaches conventional levels of significance. 
24  Conversely it could also be argued these organisations had an incentive to develop relationships with their 
‘community’ because of their higher risks. 
25  Of course, the inverse is also a possibility. 
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